Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2015

A Deer in Headlights: The Supreme Court, LGBT Rights, and Equal
Protection
Nan D. Hunter
Georgetown University Law Center, ndh5@law.georgetown.edu

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1476
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2591349

52 Hous. L. Rev. 1121-1145 (2015)
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Gender
and Sexuality Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons

Do Not Delete

3/14/2015 4:17 PM

COMMENTARY
A DEER IN HEADLIGHTS:
THE SUPREME COURT, LGBT RIGHTS, AND
EQUAL PROTECTION
Nan D. Hunter
ABSTRACT
In this Essay, I argue that the problems with how courts apply
Equal Protection principles to classifications not already recognized
as suspect reach beyond the most immediate example of sexual
orientation. Three structural weaknesses drive the juridical
reluctance to bring coherence to this body of law: two doctrinal and
one theoretical. The first doctrinal problem is that the socio-political
assumptions that the 1938 Supreme Court relied on in United
States v. Carolene Products, Inc. to justify strict scrutiny for
“discrete and insular minorities” have lost their validity. In part
because of Roe v. Wade-induced PTSD, the courts have not
generated a replacement paradigm for a society that is radically
more diverse than the United States was at that time. The second
doctrinal problem is that the discourse of Equal Protection law has
become unnecessarily moralized, tending to infuse analysis of
classifications with the question of whether a particular group of
persons deserves judicial protection against majoritarian
legislation. Finally, a theoretical issue has long plagued Equal
Protection law: the role of ideology. Ostensibly irrelevant, it has
nonetheless crept into the case law through references to, for
example, “white supremacy,” but has never been fully and properly
analyzed.
The role of ideology and its relationship to the original meaning
argument advanced by Professor Eskridge generates my primary
critique of his claim. While the dynamics of gender and sexuality
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can be separated in many instances, I argue that they are
inextricably intertwined in the ideological foundations for
discrimination based on sexual orientation (though not always in
the manifestations of such discrimination). Recognizing this melded
conceptualization would enrich equality principles more than
reading a sexual orientation distinction alone into the scope of the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Given the
Supreme Court’s antipathy to acknowledging the ideological
dimensions of inequality, however, it should consider explicit
adoption of the proportionality test that it has in fact been utilizing
in sexual orientation cases.
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INTRODUCTION

The social movement for LGBT equality has led to a
remarkable result. Public opinion on the topic once thought to be
the most controversial—the right of same-sex couples to marry—
has shifted dramatically to a position supportive of that claim.1
At the same time, when faced with LGBT equality arguments,
the Supreme Court appears to have abandoned any attempt to
develop or even explicate the law of Equal Protection. In three
decisions since 1996, the Court has acted to protect LGBT
1.
Jane Schacter, What Marriage Equality Can Tell Us About Popular
Constitutionalism (and Vice-Versa), 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1147, 1154 (2015).
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persons from discrimination without venturing beyond broad
rhetorical gestures toward concepts of equality and liberty.2
Since modern Equal Protection doctrine began with the
articulation of strict scrutiny for race-based classification,3 the
Court has addressed the standard of review applicable to a
classification multiple times during roughly a twenty-five-year
period: for sex,4 parental marital status,5 noncitizenship,6
economic status,7 and disability.8 After an internal debate
among the Justices in 1985 over whether to extend heightened
scrutiny to “new” categories,9 the Court essentially concluded
that further identification of suspect classifications was
jurisprudentially unwise.10 Although the Court strengthened
the intermediate standard for sex discrimination in United
States v. Virginia,11 it has recognized no additional bases for
heightened scrutiny for forty years. For sexual orientation
cases, the Court has paired a refusal to invoke heightened
scrutiny with an incongruous willingness to invalidate federal
and state statutes and state constitutional amendments that
disadvantage LGBT persons. It has not, however, produced the
articulation of any standard of review applicable to sexual
orientation-based classification.
At least in part, the Court’s hesitancy to extend the logic
of prior decisions that were premised on the criteria for
heightened scrutiny developed as a reaction to a reaction, that
is, to the political movement mobilized in reaction to Roe v.
Wade.12 Although not an Equal Protection decision, the social
meaning of Roe is properly understood as an equality decision
for women and the product of a social movement for women’s

2.
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632–33 (1996).
3.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
4.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
5.
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1989).
6.
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); see also Bernal v. Fainter, 467
U.S. 216, 219–20 (1984).
7.
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483–84 (1970).
8.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985).
9.
Nan D. Hunter, Proportional Equality: Readings of Romer, 89 KY. L.J. 885, 898
(2001).
10.
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442.
11.
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
12.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
194 (1986) (“The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals
with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or
design of the Constitution.”), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); cf.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719–22 (1997).
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rights.13 The backlash against Roe has frozen not only
substantive due process law, the basis of the holding in Roe,
but also may have contributed to the refusal to extend a higher
level of review in Equal Protection law involving similarly
contested “social issues.”
By now, the Court’s silence on Equal Protection standards of
review has produced its own discourse. The Court’s willingness to
act repeatedly, but without explanation, has perplexed scholars
and left lower courts scrambling for interpretive guidance. In this
Article, I enter the fray by taking the argument out of the LGBT
rights field alone and analyzing a variety of ways that the Court
could tackle a much-needed modernization of the principles
underlying heightened scrutiny in Equal Protection law.
Specifically, I argue that the current disarray has two distinct
components: doctrinal and theoretical. In Parts III and V,
respectively, I propose ways for the Court to address each.
In Part IV, I focus on the newest contribution to Equal
Protection arguments about LGBT rights: Professor Eskridge’s
assertion in the Frankel Lecture Address that, properly
understood, the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
per se mandates invalidation of laws that discriminate based on
sexual orientation.14 The Frankel Lecture Address asks, in effect,
whether original meaning theory can put the Humpty Dumpty of
current Equal Protection law together again. Professor
Eskridge’s original meaning argument rests on two pillars: a
historical analysis of the conceptual and linguistic components of
the phrase “equal protection of the law” and the incorporation of
the anti-caste principle as the primary signifier of legitimacy for
stringent judicial review.15 The latter is, to me, the more
interesting aspect of the claim, primarily because of its
implications for the scope of the shelter provided by, and the role
of ideology in, Equal Protection law. These are the dimensions of
original meaning jurisprudence to which I will turn in Parts IV
and V.
Initially, however, one must situate this analysis in the
context of Equal Protection law more broadly. In Part II, I
address the first of the two components underlying the Court’s
silence: the doctrinal gap. The Court has never broken from its
Footnote 4 foundations for heightened judicial review, even

13.
Nan D. Hunter, Reflections on Sexual Liberty and Equality: “Through Seneca
Falls and Selma and Stonewall,” 60 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 172, 179 (2013).
14.
William N. Eskridge Jr., Original Meaning and Marriage Equality, 52 HOUS. L.
REV. 1067 (2015).
15.
Id. at 1073.
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though they have been weakened by social and political change.
The process-based protections for minority rights in a democracy
may have functioned well in a demographically simple society,
but the United States has grown far more complex. In addition,
the rise of equality claims based on gender and sexuality-linked
classifications has complicated the prejudice component of
Footnote 4. The notion of prejudice has morphed into the concept
of animus, which has tended to moralize judicial assessment of
legislative classifications more than is necessary.
In Part III, I analyze what I believe are the strongest
frameworks for future Equal Protection issues that do not involve
the traditionally protected categories. First, I argue that the
Court could choose to come out of its Equal Protection closet by
explicitly adopting the metrics of proportionality, a philosophy
that the Court has not owned but the one that most closely fits
what it has actually done in sexual orientation and other cases.
Second, I consider the anti-caste principle—the first of the two
pillars of the original meaning argument. I argue that the
anti-caste principle—standing on its own and distinct from
original meaning—provides a strong alternative mode of
analysis.
In Part IV, I turn to the original meaning argument in the
Frankel Lecture. As a tactic for influencing jurists and others
who have professed allegiance to original meaning philosophy
but who are skeptical about a constitutional right of same-sex
couples to marriage, the argument is appealing. I am doubtful,
however, that it will suffice to unlock most such individuals from
more traditionalist understandings of LGBT-related questions.
My primary critique, however, is not tactical but conceptual.
Even if an original meaning standard succeeds in a sexual
orientation case, it may set the bar for meaningful Equal
Protection review too high for other important claims because of
the demanding criteria that are necessary to demonstrate the
existence of a caste-like social structure.
Finally, in Part V, I address one aspect of the theoretical
vacuum in Equal Protection law: the role of ideology. Although
an assessment of all the major theoretical shortcomings of Equal
Protection jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this Article, the
incorporation of ideology has long been a missing piece.
Identifying a hegemonic ideology behind structures of dominance
is a required element for a caste-based analysis to succeed. An
anti-caste or original meaning argument grounded solely on the
history of discrimination based on sexual orientation, as
Professor Eskridge proposes, misses the inextricable factor of
gender. It is precisely in the realm of ideology that gender
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functions most powerfully in constitutional analysis of anti-gay
subordination.
This Article goes to press shortly before the Court’s next
high impact LGBT rights decisions: the marriage equality issues
raised in Obergefell v. Hodges and related cases.16 Whatever the
outcome of that litigation, the decision on whether states must
license or recognize same-sex marriages is unlikely to answer the
deeper questions of Equal Protection jurisprudence. These
questions will remain important for years to come.
II. THE DOCTRINAL GAP: FALLING TIERS
The Supreme Court appears to have abandoned the project
of identifying explicit standards of review in LGBT-related cases.
In its three major decisions in this field, the majority of the Court
has carefully avoided discussion of the traditional tiers of Equal
Protection review. The gap created by this silence has flummoxed
advocates and lower federal court judges, who lack the freedom
to jettison doctrine, and thus have clung to the familiar structure
of three-tiered analysis both before and after the Court’s most
recent decision regarding sexual orientation and Equal
Protection in United States v. Windsor. As the Second Circuit
dryly noted in 2012, “[I]t is safe to say that there is some
doctrinal instability in this area.”17
Leading up to the Windsor decision, the briefs of the parties
and their supporting amici divided with parade ground precision
along the line of which standard of review should govern, as is
typical in conventional Equal Protection analysis.18 At issue was
the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act, which
prohibited the federal government from recognizing any
marriage between same-sex spouses, regardless of the lawfulness
of the marriage under state law.19 Both sides framed the case in
such
a
way
that
the
standard
of
review
was
outcome-determinative.20 In his opinion for the Court, Justice
Kennedy chose to ignore the issue, prompting protests by
16.
Petition for writ of certiorari granted Jan. 16, 2015. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 1039 (2015).
17.
Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d on other
grounds, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
18.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19.
Id. at 2683 (majority opinion); Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012)).
20.
See, e.g., Brief on the Merits for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal Advisory
Group of the U.S. House of Representatives at 28–30, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No.
12-307), 2013 WL 267026; Brief for the United States on the Merits Question at 18–21,
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 683048.
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dissenting Justices that the absence of an articulated standard
rendered the Court’s logic incomprehensible.21
In the Courts of Appeals decisions since Windsor, judges
have followed a variety of doctrinal paths, splitting on the level of
review to be applied and on whether a liberty or an equality
analysis should predominate. The Seventh Circuit held that the
exclusion of gay couples from marriage violated the Equal
Protection Clause under rational basis review.22 The Ninth
Circuit reached the same conclusion relying on a prior Circuit
decision finding that sexual orientation classifications must be
subject to heightened scrutiny.23 The Fourth and Tenth Circuits
utilized the equal liberty approach, suggesting that the
fundamental right to marry formed the primary predicate for
their decisions to strike down exclusionary laws, but ultimately
grounding their conclusions on an interwoven and mutually
reinforcing understanding of both liberty and equality.24
The Sixth Circuit, by contrast, rejected each of the possible
bases for a finding of unconstitutionality and upheld bans on
same-sex marriage in four states.25 In analyzing the correct
standard for Equal Protection review, the court invoked the most
deferential form of rational basis: “Our task . . . is to decide
whether the law has some conceivable basis, not to gauge how
that rationale stacks up against the arguments on the other
side,” and cited Windsor as authority for recognizing the
traditional role of states in defining marriage.26 Rather than a
motivation based on animus, the court identified “fear that the
courts would seize control over an issue that people of good faith
care deeply about” as the driving force behind bans on same-sex
marriage.27
It is no wonder that there is a cacophony in the lower federal
courts, when the Supreme Court itself appears to have reached a
doctrinal dead end. In this situation, it is understandable that
lower courts and advocates would continue to structure their
Equal Protection reasoning around the standard of review. That
focus, however, misses two structural factors that converge in the
21.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2706–07 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2716 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the decision “seems to rest on [Equal Protection]”).
22.
Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 656 (7th Cir. 2014).
23.
Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 464–65 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing SmithKline Beecham
Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014)).
24.
Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 367, 384 (4th Cir. 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert,
755 F.3d 1193, 1199, 1228 (10th Cir. 2014).
25.
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 396 (6th Cir. 2014).
26.
Id. at 408 (citing Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689).
27.
Id.
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Supreme Court’s silence: the broken foundation for stringent
judicial review of legislative classifications and the moralized
social meaning of strict scrutiny.
A. The Obsolescence of Footnote 4
The status quo of Equal Protection analysis, under which the
tiers of review developed, emerged from the Court’s famous
Footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products,28 later
elaborated by John Hart Ely’s concept of representation
reinforcement.29 Although that argument initially garnered wide
support among scholars and judges, it no longer holds the same
position of preeminence. The persuasiveness of the
representation reinforcement principle has weakened steadily
since Bruce Ackerman’s deconstruction of the concept of “discrete
and insular minority,” arguing that it is the wrong beginning
point for application of heightened scrutiny.30
For Ackerman, the Footnote 4 representation reinforcement
argument failed the test of late twentieth century politics
because it gave too little weight to the potential impact of social
movement mobilization that could be deployed by distinctive
minorities31 and because it overlooked members of anonymous or
diffuse groups32 “who, in the future, will have the greatest cause
to complain that pluralist bargaining exposes them to
systematic—and undemocratic—disadvantage.”33 The deepest
harm from discrimination, he argued, was its impact on pariah
groups, those whose interests failed to garner even respectful
engagement and consideration in the legislative process.34
Ackerman used gay people to illustrate his argument that “[l]ong
after discrete and insular minorities have gained strong
representation at the pluralist bargaining table, there will
remain many other groups who fail to achieve influence remotely
proportionate to their numbers.”35

28.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (suggesting
that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition
[justifying judicial intervention], which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities”).
29.
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 87–
88 (1980).
30.
Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 734
(1985).
31.
Id. at 723–28.
32.
Id. at 729–33.
33.
Id. at 737.
34.
Id. at 732, 38.
35.
Id. at 742.
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The paradox of political power in the United States—that
minoritarian civil rights protections are achieved only when there is
majoritarian support—has grown more complex since Ackerman
wrote his article. The United States no longer contains only the
relatively simple categories of race, national origin, and religion that
constituted minority groups as the 1938 Court understood them in
Footnote 4. Today a messy mix of hundreds of social groups occupies
the demographic landscape.36 Patterns of assimilation and
intermarriage blur the borders of each group, further complicating the
premises underlying the representation reinforcement principle.37
The same-sex marriage debate, with the adoption of equal
marriage rights by democratic legislative or electoral majorities in
twelve states plus the District of Columbia,38 illustrates how far the
social reality has come since Ackerman used the example of gay men
and lesbians to demonstrate the pariah principle. To put it
colloquially, this is not your grandfather’s discrete and insular
minority.
The complexity of contemporary U.S. society has made the
old criterion of zero-sum political powerlessness largely
irrelevant. The white majority has decreased from 90% of the
population in 1940 to 75% in 2010.39 The Census Bureau
predicts that whites will become a population minority by
2043.40 The largest single ethnic minority today is Hispanics, a
group that was not even counted in 1940.41 For the late 1930s,
36.
See infra notes 40–44 and accompanying text.
37.
Marriage across racial and ethnic lines is increasing in the United States.
In 1960, less than 1% of married couples were interracial. Table 1. Race of Wife by
Race of Husband: 1960, 1970, 1980, 1991, and 1992, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 10,
1998), http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/race/interractab1.txt. In 1980, 6.7%
of new marriages involved spouses of different races or ethnicities; in 2010, the rate
had more than doubled to 15.1%. PAUL T AYLOR ET AL., P EW RESEARCH CTR ., THE RISE
OF INTERMARRIAGE: RATES, CHARACTERISTICS VARY BY R ACE AND GENDER 5 (2012). A
telephone survey in 2009 found that 35% of adults say that they have a close relative
who is married to someone of a different race. Id. at 37 & n.17.
38.
Equal marriage laws have resulted from majoritarian law making in
Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington.
Same-Sex Marriage Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. L EGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org
/research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-laws.aspx (last updated Feb. 9, 2015).
39.
Compare BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1948, at 19 (1948), with KAREN R. HUMES, NICHOLAS A.
JONES & ROBERTO R. RAMIREZ, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, OVERVIEW OF RACE AND HISPANIC
ORIGIN: 2010, at 7 tbl.3 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010
/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf.
40.
U.S. Census Bureau Projections Show a Slower Growing, Older, More
Diverse Nation a Half Century from Now, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 12, 2012),
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/population/cb12-243.html.
41.
Compare HUMES, JONES & RAMIREZ, supra note 39, at 6 tbl.2, 7 tbl.3, with
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 39, at 19.
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the Statistical Abstract did not report numbers for any
religions other than Christian or Jewish faiths.42 Today, the
Pew Research Center includes Hindus, Native American
religions, New Age faiths, and three subcategories each of
Buddhists and Muslims in its reports on religion in the United
States.43
As LGBT political progress has demonstrated, even a
minority that is quite small can achieve meaningful political
power. Urban areas have long been a stronghold for LGBT
political power, and effective coalition building within, and
allegiance to, a political party can extend that power beyond the
urban context.44 Yet despite strong LGBT representation at the
pluralist bargaining table, there also remain enormous
geographic disparities.45 If the Court wishes to articulate a
coherent doctrinal approach in sexual orientation discrimination
cases, it must acknowledge the possibility of profound
unevenness in political representation and jettison a zero-sum
metric of powerlessness.
Although too long overlooked, the Carolene Products decision
itself supports such flexibility. It envisions enhanced scrutiny of
classifications penalizing characteristics that were disfavored in
a particular time and place, in addition to characteristics such as
race that have been enduring subjects of disfavor. The cases cited
in Footnote 4 allude to discrimination against persons who were
geographic outsiders in a particular state, even though not
members of an otherwise stigmatized group,46 and Americans of
German descent during a particular time period.47 Although
42.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF
pt. 1, at 389–92 (1975).
43.
PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY 5
(2008), available at http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-landscape-study
-full.pdf.
44.
Marieka Klawitter & Brian Hammer, Spatial and Temporal Diffusion of Local
Antidiscrimination Policies for Sexual Orientation, in GAYS AND LESBIANS IN THE
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 22, 33 (Ellen D. B. Riggle & Barry L. Tadlock eds., 1999).
45.
Schacter, supra note 1, at 1170–71.
46.
S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2 (1938). In
Barnwell, the Court found that even in an ordinary commercial regulation, an invidious
distinction disadvantaging geographic and political outsiders could be invalid. As the
Court explained, in conjunction with citing other cases as support, “[W]hen the regulation
is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon those without the state,
legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are
normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the
state.” Id. at 185 n.2.
47. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 529–30 (1925); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404,
409–10 (1923); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 396–97 (1923). The statutes at issue in all
three of these cases barred the teaching of German in public schools and were enacted in the
wake of World War I. Cf. Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298 (1927).
THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970,
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“differences in race and color” have historically served as
markers of discrimination, the Court also has a record of
understanding that “community prejudices are not static, and
from time to time other differences from the community norm
may define other groups which need the same protection.”48 It is
this more contingent understanding of political power that the
Court will need to reconsider in the future.
B. The Moralization of Strict Scrutiny
The Court’s reluctance to be more clear about its Equal
Protection standards does not signal an unwillingness to develop
new doctrine (there are plenty of examples of new doctrine in
other fields), but rather an inability to escape being caught in the
gears of normative change in the broader society. The majority of
Justices have sought to eliminate egregious forms of
discrimination based on sexual orientation, without endorsing
the proposition that sexual orientation is a neutral characteristic
and that agents of the state may not assign moral weight to an
individual’s sexual orientation. Fear of a backlash against such a
position by social conservatives, and memory of the backlash
against Roe v. Wade, has produced a jurisprudence of minimalist
incrementalism.
This fear, and the resulting intentional obfuscation of the
interpretive principles normally embedded in precedent, is
exacerbated by the right and wrong morality associated with the
anti-discrimination command. Too often, the mandate of equal
protection of the law bleeds into a moral assessment of the
affected group, rather than the propriety of a classification. The
shorthand question for strict scrutiny can too easily become
whether the group deserves protection rather than whether the
classification can be justified.
In Equal Protection law, this moralization has come to a
head in the Court’s use of animus as a marker of illicit
legislative motive. The Court relied heavily on an inference of
animus to invalidate a state constitutional amendment in
Romer v. Evans,49 and Justice O’Connor made the articulation
of an animus-based standard the grounding for her concurring
opinion in Lawrence v. Texas.50 In Windsor, the Court once
again alluded to prejudice as a central rationale for striking
down DOMA.51
48.
49.
50.
51.

Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954).
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579–85 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013).
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Using morality-inflected language to promote equality norms
may seem appealing, but that discourse has not served women
and sexual minorities well.52 Discomfort with venturing into the
terrain of moral questions related to sexuality may partially
explain why the Court has not more clearly formulated its
doctrinal approach to LGBT cases. This category of cases will not
disappear with the Court’s resolution of nationwide marriage
rights, however. A more secular and sedate invocation of civic
norms may seem less inspirational, but could be more productive
in the long run in changing social practices.
C. Summary
These two structural cracks in the underpinnings of the
Footnote 4 paradigm create the demand and opportunity for the
Court to explore new approaches to Equal Protection law. Sexual
orientation cases provide an excellent context for that
re-examination. This category of cases has signaled that the old
engines for heightened judicial review—whether the presence of
a discrete and insular minority or the absence of political
power—are obsolete in today’s complex political and social
culture. Moreover, a rhetoric or structure of reasoning that loads
too much moral weight onto the concept of animus might
contribute to, rather than discourage, an incitement of backlash
against current and future generations of civil rights law. If the
Court wishes to salvage the basic insight of Footnote 4—that
legislative classifications must meet certain criteria for
prejudice-driven failures of the democratic process before judicial
invalidation can be justified—it must adapt representation
reinforcement principles to contemporary society.
III. DIVERGING PATHS
In the pending marriage cases, probably the smartest bet
would be that the Court will continue its minimalist
jurisprudence regardless of the possibility that the decision could
change marriage laws across the country. Especially if Justice
Kennedy writes the opinion of the Court and follows his own
precedents, the Court may simply pave over the conceptual
problems in the doctrine, and produce results rather than
reasoning.
The Court also has two other options that would delay a
moment of reckoning with the problem of how to assess
52.
See Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights
Laws?, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 781, 782 (2007).
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classifications that reinforce disadvantage and stigma, but which
do not fall within the traditional categories of heightened
scrutiny. First, the Court may elect to ground a marriage
decision in the Liberty—rather than the Equal Protection—
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.53 In that way, the Court
could sidestep equality doctrine completely, as it did in its
invalidation of a state sodomy law.54 Second, the Court may
prefer to conceptualize sexual orientation discrimination as sex
discrimination, recognizing that the same gender stereotypes
that drive discrimination against women also stigmatize anyone
who does not conform to gender norms, including in their sexual
practices and choice of partners.55 The questions that I address in
this Article are those that will remain after such a decision on
the marriage issue.
If and when the Court does elect to mark a trail out of its
self-created predicament, two possible paths suggest themselves.
The Court could venture down the path utilized by virtually
every major common law constitutional court in the world except
the United States: the analysis of discriminatory classifications
under the principle of proportionality. Alternatively, it could
return to first principles and recuperate the anti-caste mandate
that animated the Reconstruction era framers. I shall evaluate
each possibility in turn as it applies to sexual orientation
discrimination.
A. Proportionality
Other than the United States, all three of the major judicial
systems that have decided multiple LGBT rights claims—
Canada, the European Court of Human Rights, and South
Africa—utilize a proportionality approach when adjudicating
constitutional equality issues.56 The core inquiry underlying a
proportionality analysis is whether the burdens imposed on a
politically vulnerable minority are discontinuous with, and
53.
The right to marry is recognized as fundamental under the Due Process Clause.
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94–95 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978).
54.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79.
55.
Several lower courts have noted the applicability of a sex discrimination
framework. See Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 479–85 (9th Cir. 2014) (Berzon, J.,
concurring); Jernigan v. Crane, No. 4:13-cv-00410 KGB, 2014 WL 6685391, at *23–24
(E.D. Ark. Nov. 25, 2014); Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard, No. 4:14-CV-04081-KES, 2014 WL
6386903, at *10–11 (D.S.D. Nov. 14, 2014); Lawson v. Kelly, No. 14-0622-CV-W-ODS,
2014 WL 5810215, at *8 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d
1181, 1206 (D. Utah 2013), aff’d on other grounds, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014).
56.
Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 531 para. 138 (Can.); Karner v. Austria,
2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 199, 212; Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at
550–55 paras. 63–74 (S. Afr.).

Do Not Delete

1134

3/14/2015 4:17 PM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[52:4

disproportional to, whatever neutral public goals are asserted as
the purpose of the challenged provision.
Proportionality analysis turns on a multi-step standard.
Courts ask first “whether a prima facie case has been made to
the effect that a government act burdens the exercise of a
right.”57 This is the threshold point at which courts determine
which classifications trigger equality jurisprudence and thereby
merit any scrutiny at all. At the next stage, these other systems
have developed a method for determining when government may
treat groups of individuals differently by asking a series of three
questions, known as the limitations analysis:
1. Whether the burden on the asserted right is rationally
related to a sufficiently legitimate government objective;
2. Whether there is a less restrictive means by which the
government could achieve the same goal without
burdening the right; and
3. Whether the burden on the right outweighs the benefits
to the government of its infringement.58
The similarities and differences compared to Equal
Protection analysis in the United States are fairly self-evident. If
a claimant succeeds at the prima facie stage, the analysis inverts
what traditionally had been the logical order in American case
law. In earlier U.S. discrimination cases, courts first asked
whether a classification met the criteria for heightened scrutiny;
if so, courts proceeded to the probing questions that comprise the
second and third queries of the limitations analysis. U.S. courts
reached a rational basis standard only if it had found that the
classification did not entail heightened scrutiny.
Under a proportionality analysis, the initial threshold is
much lower. When courts assess whether to pursue any equality
review, there is no initial channeling of classifications into tiers,
as has developed in U.S. law. Instead, if there are any indicia of
invidious or systemic discrimination, constitutional courts first
ask whether there is a rational basis. Even if a rational basis
exists, the inquiry nonetheless goes on to the second and third
queries, thus pursuing the elements of stricter scrutiny.
The proportionality model of analysis precisely describes
what the Supreme Court has actually done in its three major
LGBT rights cases. After reviewing the animus or prejudice
underlying an anti-gay law, the Court—without articulating a
specific tier of review—has concluded that the law in question
57.
Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American Rights
Review and the Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 802 (2011).
58.
Id. at 802–03.
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effectively lacks a rational basis. At that point, as in a
disproportionality analysis, the Court has reached its judgment.
This conceptual overlap between proportionality and the
LGBT case results has gone unnoticed.59 Only one Justice of the
Supreme Court has explicitly alluded to disproportionality
analysis and then not in the context of LGBT rights issues.60
None of the post-Windsor lower federal courts have utilized this
method in the flood of marriage law challenges that followed that
decision.
The controversy associated with importation of non-U.S. law—
even from our closest jurisprudential kin—suggests why advocates
might hesitate to press such an approach too strongly.61 The foreign
law canard is a red herring, however. There is a significant history
of proportionality concepts in the Court’s constitutional precedents.
The proportionality principle also explains a number of nonsexual
orientation cases in which the Court has struck down legislation
imposing burdens based on nonsuspect classifications and burdens
on nonfundamental liberties.
In Plyler v. Doe, for example, the Court struck down a law
barring undocumented resident children from public schools,
noting that their immigration status was a legitimate basis for
classification, yet their exclusion from public schools would
produce “a lifetime [of] hardship” with the “stigma of illiteracy
[that] will mark them for the rest of their lives.”62 The Court has
also struck down laws imposing especially serious burdens on
low-income persons even though poverty is not a suspect
classification. “[I]n criminal trials a State can no more
discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion,
race, or color.”63 Although there is no absolute constitutional
right to initiate litigation or appeal, the Court has struck down
economic barriers in civil cases implicating important liberty
interests.64
59.
I described the Romer opinion as grounded in the concept of proportionality but
did not elaborate on the doctrine as developed outside the United States. Hunter, supra
note 9, at 908.
60.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689–90 (2008) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
61.
See Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Against Foreign Law, 29 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 291, 291–95 (2005). See generally The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in
U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice
Stephen Breyer, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519 (2005) (Norman Dorsen, moderator).
62.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982).
63.
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956).
64.
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 107 (1996) (termination of parental rights); cf.
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380–81 (1971) (access to judicial proceedings for
divorce).
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The overarching principle that greater burdens require more
persuasive justifications is the conceptual key to the Court’s
constitutional jurisprudence in sexual orientation cases. What is
most striking is not what the Justices have said or not said, but
what they have done. In each of its three most significant
decisions, the Court has essentially concluded that laws barring
normal amendment of civil rights statutes, criminalizing
intimate sexual conduct, and disqualifying one group of lawful
marriages from recognition under federal law are grossly
excessive measures in relation to the purported goals of the
legislation. This is proportionality analysis if it is anything, and
one option for the Court to end its doctrinal muddle would be for
it to name it for what it is.
B. Caste
A second conceptual option for the Supreme Court in
approaching LGBT rights issues is to invoke the anti-caste
principle animating the Fourteenth Amendment. Professor
Eskridge’s Article provides a powerful description of this
principle’s historical importance. Although he does so as part of
an argument for application of an original meaning
understanding, I discuss the two ideas separately in this Article
because the Court could choose to utilize either or both branches
of the conjoined theory in its same-sex marriage analysis. In
other words, a caste analysis does not necessarily require
adoption of original meaning jurisprudence, which I will treat in
more detail in the next section.
Similarly to proportionality, one could argue that the Court
has already begun using caste analysis in LGBT rights cases.
The origins of the anti-caste argument in this category of cases
lie in the amicus brief on behalf of constitutional law professors
filed by Professor Laurence Tribe in Romer v. Evans.65 Tribe’s
brief eschewed discussion of the tiers of Equal Protection review
and instead painted equality under law in the broad strokes
adopted by Justice Kennedy in his opinion for the Court.66
65.
Brief of Laurence H. Tribe et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at
1–3, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039), 1995 WL 17008432.
66. Compare id. at 3–4 (“To decree that some identifying feature or characteristic of a
person or group may not be invoked as the basis of any claim of discrimination under any law
or regulation enacted, previously or in the future, by the state, its agencies, or its localities—
when persons and groups not sharing this characteristic are not similarly handicapped—is, by
definition, to deny the ‘equal protection of the laws’ to persons having that characteristic.”
(emphasis in original)), with Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (“A law declaring that in general it shall
be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is
itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense.”).
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The greatest appeal of the caste analogy as an analytic tool
for courts is that it is simultaneously broad and narrow. Its
origins in Equal Protection jurisprudence lay in the radical
egalitarianism (for that time) of the Reconstruction framers and
their intense antipathy to laws that “entrench social groups as
inferior castes.”67 Its built-in limiting principle is that caste
surely signals a systemic structure that is far more damaging
and malicious than mere discrimination. Minimally, one could
say that the caste analogy requires at least five independent
criteria:
1. A pattern of legal and social adverse treatment that is
pervasive;
2. That the pattern is continuous over a long period of time,
even if diminishing during some periods;
3. That its enforceability is strengthened by the targeting of
a single characteristic;
4. That the cumulative effect suppresses open and robust
political contestation by those who are disadvantaged;
and
5. That no strong public or governmental interest justifies
its existence.68
To this formidable list, the original meaning claim
articulated by Professor Eskridge adds an additional
requirement: that a caste-like system is one driven by an
ideology of invidiousness. I agree that such an ideology should
trigger searching review. The separate-but-equal apartheid of
southern segregation, for example, was doomed never to produce
equality, even had southern whites invested resources in ways
that led to equal test scores or teacher salaries in the black-only
schools, because the propagation of the ideology of white
supremacy was embedded at every level of public education. And
I welcome the explicit addition of ideology to an understanding of
the anti-caste principle that various scholars have argued
properly belongs at the center of Equal Protection jurisprudence.
Securing
that
understanding,
however,
like
an
acknowledgment of the role of proportionality, likely will have to
await a future Court with a different political stripe. In its race
jurisprudence, the current Court seems to have slammed this
particular analytic door shut. As Justice Stevens noted in an
affirmative action case, “There is no moral or constitutional
67.
Eskridge, supra note 14, at 1084; see J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status,
106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2353–54 (1997).
68.
This distillation is drawn from the cases cited in Eskridge, supra note 14,
passim.
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equivalence between a policy that is designed to perpetuate a
caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial
subordination.”69 Since that time, the racism-blind use of a
heightened standard of review regardless of whether whites or
racial minorities claim discriminatory treatment has remained in
place. It is difficult to imagine that the Court will see the
anti-gay history that Professor Eskridge has so carefully
documented as comparable to caste when it apparently cannot
see the treatment of nonwhite persons as such.
C. Summary
The foregoing options represent different jurisprudential
approaches to interpretation. The adoption of the proportionality
principle speaks to a mindset of pragmatic governance. It seeks
balance and fairness rather than modifications to the weight of this
or that interest or the suspectness of each new classification. The
anti-caste principle turns to a more directly historical approach,
focusing on the dynamics of subordination that have affected each
group. Either could become the basis for a more fully reasoned
articulation of Equal Protection law. At stake is the future of
classifications based not only on sexual orientation, but also on
other grounds that will emerge in the future as similarly contested.
IV. ORIGINALISM’S LIVING MEANING
Justice Scalia: . . . I’m curious . . . when did it become
unconstitutional to exclude homosexual couples from
marriage? 1791? 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment
was adopted? . . .
Mr. Olson: . . . [M]ay I answer this in the form of a
rhetorical question? When did it become unconstitutional to
prohibit interracial marriages? When did it become
unconstitutional to assign children to separate schools[?]
Justice Scalia: It’s an easy question, I think, for that one.
At . . . the time that the Equal Protection Clause was
adopted. That’s absolutely true. But don’t give me a
question to my question. . . . When do you think it became
unconstitutional? Has it always been unconstitutional?
Mr. Olson: When the . . . California Supreme Court faced
the decision, which it had never faced before, [of: D]oes
excluding gay and lesbian citizens, who are a class based
upon their status as homosexuals . . . .

69.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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Justice Scalia: [T]hat’s . . . not when it became
unconstitutional. . . . When did it become unconstitutional
to prohibit gays from marrying?
Mr. Olson: . . . [T]hey did not assign a date to it, Justice
Scalia, as you know. . . .
Justice Scalia: I’m not talking about the California
Supreme Court. . . . You say it is now unconstitutional.
Mr. Olson: Yes.
Justice Scalia: Was it always unconstitutional?
Mr. Olson: It was constitutional [sic] when we—as a
culture determined that sexual orientation is a
characteristic of individuals that they cannot control . . . .
Justice Scalia: I see. When did that happen? When did
that happen?
Mr. Olson: There’s no specific date in time. This is an
evolutionary cycle.
Justice Scalia: Well, how am I supposed to know how to
decide a case . . . if you can’t give me a date when the
Constitution changes?

....
Justice Scalia: 50 years ago, it was okay?
Mr. Olson: . . . I can’t answer that question . . . .
Justice Scalia: I can’t either. That’s the problem. That’s
exactly the problem.70
The Scalia-Olson exchange pointedly framed an enduring
puzzle embedded in constitutionalism: How can judicial
interpretation of unamended text legitimately accommodate
various forms of change, especially changes in the social
meanings and moral valence of certain behaviors. There is no
more contentious example of this problem than the unstable
cultural consensus regarding expressions of gender and sexuality
that has emerged in the last decade. Reconciling this rocky past
to the principle of fidelity to original meaning is no easy task.
The Frankel Lecture contributes to the emergence of what
one might describe as a truce in one corner of jurisprudential
politics. Scholars loosely associated with right, left, and center
have endorsed the idea that the starting point for constitutional
interpretation should be the original public meaning of
constitutional text, even if the full reach of this meaning was not
endorsed or expected by the framers. Professor Steven Calabresi
70.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 38–41, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652
(2013) (No. 12-144).
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has used this interpretive method to argue that several of the
Court’s decisions in pro-equality cases, including Loving v.
Virginia,71 can be justified as implementations of original
meaning,72 and he has recently posted an essay on SSRN in
which he argues that original meaning also mandates the
invalidation of exclusionary marriage laws.73 Professor Jack
Balkin has proffered a theory of “framework originalism” that
would produce essentially the same results.74 Professor
Eskridge’s Frankel Lecture Address provides by far the most
extensive articulation of the link between original meaning and
the issues raised in the same-sex marriage cases.
My first hesitation about this original meaning argument is
tactical and retrospective. Simply put, given the retrenchment of
the Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence in the context of race,
I am skeptical that judges and others who promote originalist
interpretative strategies would adopt the method as proffered for
the same-sex marriage cases.75 Even traditional originalists have
accepted Brown v. Board of Education and Loving v. Virginia as
legitimate exercises of Equal Protection review. Yet, as Justice
Scalia’s comments in the foregoing colloquy illustrate, those
views can coexist with a willingness to apply different standards
for race than for other forms of discrimination and to stress
literal differentiation over effective subordination in the
interpretive process. I doubt that the originalist methodology
associated, for example, with Justice Scalia is likely to produce
recognition that laws excluding gay and lesbian couples from
marriage fall into the same category as those invalidated in
Loving.
My second concern is conceptual and prospective. An original
meaning approach potentially narrows the scope of Equal
Protection. The linguistic lynchpin in the Loving decision that
supports an analysis based on caste is the Court’s explicit
71.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
72.
Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism and Loving v. Virginia,
2012 BYU L. REV. 1393, 1398; see also Steven G. Calabresi & Michael W. Perl,
Originalism and Brown v. Board of Education 11–12 (Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law &
Legal
Theory
Series,
Working
Paper
No.
13-26,
2013),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2307651; Steven G. Calabresi & Julia
T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 15 (2011).
73.
See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah M. Begley, Originalism and Same
Sex Marriage (Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Series, Working Paper
No. 14-51, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2509443.
74.
JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 21–22 (2011).
75.
See, e.g., DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 403 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Nobody in this
case . . . argues that the people who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment understood it to
require the States to change the definition of marriage.”).
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reference to “White Supremacy.”76 Without either that reference
or the history of southern white extremism, however, the Court
surely should have reached the same result.
Consider the example of disability. The Court rejected
heightened scrutiny for classifications based on disability in City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, but nonetheless
invalidated a restriction on group homes for mentally disabled
persons, in one of its first uses of heightened rational basis
review.77 Few constitutional cases have raised disability
discrimination issues since Cleburne because of a series of
subsequent legislative actions by Congress that provided
protection in federally funded programs, employment, public
accommodations, transportation, and housing.78 As a result, the
practical need for anti-discrimination litigation based on the
Constitution has been all but erased in this field.
The major constitutional development since Cleburne has
been to weaken anti-discrimination statutes for having gone too
far in holding states liable for discrimination. A state
government entity challenged the Americans with Disabilities
Act successfully on the ground that Congress lacked sufficient
proof of a history of widespread and persistent discrimination by
the states to justify the waiver of state sovereign immunity.79 If
the record that Congress had established, which was significant,
could not survive the congruence and proportionality standard, it
seems quite unlikely that the Court would find it to be a proper
basis for a finding of caste-like subordination.80 This ruling
suggests, then, that an original meaning approach would offer
little support for classifications such as disability that have
elicited a mix of positive as well as negative regulatory responses
by the government, were not thought of as a social minority until
relatively recently, and comprise a huge range of conditions from
the most stigmatized and vulnerable to the largely invisible.
For a second example of classifications for which there is
little recourse for irrational discrimination, one could analyze
those based on immigration or citizenship status. Congress has
long been accorded plenary power to regulate immigration, in
cases that date back to roughly the same post-Reconstruction era
76.
Loving, 388 U.S. at 7.
77.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442, 450 (1985).
78.
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553; Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327; Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619; Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355.
79.
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368, 370 (2001).
80.
Id. at 374.
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in which the Court endorsed Jim Crow laws.81 The text of the
Equal Protection Clause references “persons,” not “citizens.” Yet
noncitizens are routinely treated unequally. Unlike Bowers v.
Hardwick,82 Korematsu has never been reversed.83
I would argue that resident noncitizens satisfy the indicia of
caste. A variety of laws envelop them in a system of disfavored
status, with compounding results. This system of subordination
also satisfies the requirement of an underlying ideology: that of
nationalism. Stated alternatively, the law demands that the
individual profess loyalty to a set of ideas thought to constitute
Americanism, with no requirement that the absence of such
loyalty would result in harm to valid interests of the nation.84
In sum, my primary concern regarding an original meaning
argument is whether it is too self-limiting to provide relief to
persons who have suffered from systems of social hierarchy in
the United States, and who are today’s pariahs. Although
Professor Eskridge’s proposal is intended as an expansion of
equality principles, the Court’s adoption of an original meaning
basis for a ruling that bans on same-sex marriage violate the
Constitution risks having the ultimate effect of narrowing the
scope of the Equal Protection Clause.
V. THE THEORETICAL VACUUM: THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY
If original meaning prohibits castes, and castes require an
underlying ideology of invidiousness to qualify as such, then in
making an anti-caste argument against the subordination of
LGBT persons, one must identify the ideology driving the
discrimination. Professor Eskridge argues that compulsory
heterosexuality is that ideology, fueled by stereotypes of “gay” as
anti-family and of LGBT persons as sex-obsessed predators on
children.
The regime of compulsory heterosexuality that emerged as
various disciplinary structures, including law, began penalizing
same-sex desire, operated in tandem with profound gender
normativity. Effeminate men and masculine women became the
public face of sodomy and the core of gender deviant

81.
See Mark S. Kende, Justice Clarence Thomas’s Korematsu Problem, 30 HARV. J.
RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 293, 293 & n.3 (2014) (noting efforts to get the U.S. Supreme
Court to repudiate the decision).
82.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003).
83.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
84.
Nikhil Aziz & Chip Berlet, Nationalism, in DEFENDING IMMIGRANT RIGHTS: AN
ACTIVIST RESOURCE KIT 45, 47 (2002).
ON
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subcultures.85 To use Professor Eskridge’s terminology and
periodization, the “anti-gay terror” of 1921 to 1969 began not only
with the prosecutions of gays, but also with the era of “the new
woman” who claimed for herself sexual and reproductive
autonomy.86 Although not perfectly in sync, the evolution of
gender norms into somewhat less strictly binary codes in the
latter part of the twentieth and the first part of the twenty-first
century coincided with the growing toleration of gender deviance
and lesbian and gay sexual culture.
The central role of gender normativity carries over into
the specific realm of marriage law. First recognized during
Phyllis Schlafly’s campaign against the Equal Rights
Amendment on the ground that its adoption would lead to
same-sex marriage,87 the argument that “genderless marriage”
threatens social stability and particularly the welfare of
children has fueled the crusade against legalization of gay
marriage.88 As is often true of social panics, it is impossible to
distill which of several tropes most reliably produce a level of
anxiety that can be mobilized for political contests. Indeed, the
relative force of particular arguments may shift over time.
Certainly today, however, the discomfort over unconventional
gender roles is as fundamental to anti-gay campaigns as
disgust over specific sexual acts.89
In her concurring opinion in the challenge to same-sex
marriage bans in Nevada and Idaho, Judge Marsha Berzon
described the history of legal restrictions on women’s choices in
the arenas of work, marriage, parenting, and other life activities,
and tied them to the same stereotyping underlying arguments
that the law should prohibit “genderless” marriage by same-sex
couples.90 The gender stereotyping behind bans on same-sex
marriage, she concluded, “affect[s] men and women in basically
the same way as, not in a fundamentally different manner from,
85.
JOHN D’EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 226–28, 288–95 (1988).
86.
Id. at 233–34.
87.
See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and
Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1389–93
(2006).
88.
See, for example, repeated references to how the defendants in one recent samesex marriage case framed their arguments as objections to allowing “genderless marriage”
because equal marriage laws lack “gender complementarity” and fail to reinforce “[t]he
man-woman meaning at the core of the marriage institution [that] has always recognized,
valorized, and made normative the roles of ‘mother’ and ‘father’ . . . .” Latta v. Otter, 771
F.3d 456, 486, 490–91 (9th Cir. 2014) (Berzon, J., concurring).
89.
Id. at 473 (majority opinion).
90.
Id. at 486–87 (Berzon, J., concurring).
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a wide range of laws and policies that have been viewed
consistently as discrimination based on sex.”91
This foundation of gender in the debates over LGBT rights
broadly and same-sex marriage specifically complicates the
argument that an anti-gay caste system underlies the laws that
are currently under challenge. Applying a caste analysis based
on sexual orientation alone misses the inextricable melding of
sexuality with gender. Although the two themes overlap and
reinforce one another in multiple ways, they are distinguishable.
Professor Eskridge’s Article correctly points to a series of state
actions directed specifically at homosexual persons, regardless of
gender.92 The problem is that while the historical narrative may
support the claim of a caste-like regime based on repressive
anti-gay actions by the state, it is considerably weaker in
demonstrating that the regime’s ideology centered so clearly on
sexuality as distinct from gender.
My argument is not that gender simply trumps sexual
orientation in the analytic calculus. It is also true that an
element related to sexuality has almost always been present in
the ideology and legal structure of gender subordination. Just as
one finds gender normativity at the heart of repressive laws
directed at gay men and lesbians, one finds sexuality and
specifically sexual restriction at the heart of laws that have
limited women’s liberty. Looked at through a broader lens than
homosexuality, sexual regulation has always been gendered.
Whether one examines laws addressing pregnancy, reproductive
decision-making, sexual violence, workplace norms, or military
service, “burdens on women’s sexual expression . . . enforce[]
traditional gender roles by binding women to the reproductive
consequences of heterosexual activity”93 and by enforcing gender
normativity within families.
The two discourses of sexuality and gender are most merged
in the realm of ideology, one comparable to the white supremacy
identified by the Court as underlying the anti-miscegenation
laws struck down in Loving v. Virginia. Gender performance and
sexual dissent constitute the expressive dimension of the equal
liberty claims at issue both in LGBT rights litigation and in
women’s rights cases.94 The struggle on the ground for the

91.
92.
93.

Id.
Eskridge, supra note 14, at 1094–98.
Kim Shayo Buchanan, Lawrence v. Geduldig: Regulating Women’s Sexuality, 56
EMORY L.J. 1235, 1238 (2007).
94.
I develop this argument more fully in Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity:
Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 9–12 (2000).
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freedom to breathe life into new gender and sexual norms is very
much a battle of ideas. The power of the closet is and has always
been its capacity to police discursive space.
The best mechanism for incorporating an original meaning
jurisprudence into this line of cases would take us back even
further than the origins of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Fundamentally, nonnormative forms of sexuality and gender
constitute performances of dissent. Thus, the correct answer to
Justice Scalia’s question to Ted Olson about when bans on gay
marriage became unconstitutional is 1791. That is the year when
the framers adopted the First Amendment’s guarantee of
protection against state-enforced orthodoxy.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court is at a crossroads in its Equal Protection
jurisprudence. Cases involving LGBT rights issues have
identified the need for the Court to craft a new generation of
Equal Protection law, if only to serve its traditional function of
providing meaningful guidance in future cases. Deficiencies in
current law go beyond mere lack of clarity, however. How the
Court addresses the current doctrinal and theoretical
shortcomings in this corner of constitutional law will help shape
new social meanings of equality.

